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Extension and intension are connected with the distinguishability of objects. It is 
important whether we are dealing with distinguishable or indistinguishable 
entities, and how they coexist among themselves. Is distinguishability a feature 
that belongs to mathematical entities independently of cognitive acts, or are 
those features perhaps assigned by consciousness in the course of creative 
analysis? This problem was considered by Zermelo when constructing the 
axiom of separation (Axiom der Aussonderung). In his work of 1906 there 
appears the term “definite”, used to express the fact that all elements of a 
domain are pairwise distinguishable in such a way that in every case it is 
possible to ascertain whether a=b or a≠b. Zermelo refers to “well-defined sets” 
(wohldefinierte Mengen) and “well-defined properties” (wohldefinierte 
Eigenschaften). The term “definite” was used and analysed by Edmund Husserl 
in two lectures given at the Göttingen Mathematical Society. A deeper 
mathematical analysis of that concept appeared in his “Formal and 
Transcendental Logic” in relation to a definite aggregate [1]. We shall return to 
that work later. Bertrand Russell, analysing Plato’s arguments contained in the 
“Parmenides” dialogue [Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy] comes to the 
conclusion that numbers do not have being, and calls them “logical fictions”. 
Stewart Shapiro considered the Julius Caesar problem in a chapter titled 
“Structuralism–Ontology: Object” [2]. It is a problem that orients the 
philosophy of mathematics towards Ontology. 
The problem arises again in analysis by Benacerraf addressing the issue of 
multiple reduction, namely the representation of numbers in different ways [3]. 
What kind of set is the number 3 – {, {},{,{}}} in von Neumann’s 
scheme, or {{{}}} in Zermelo’s – or is it a set at all? Benacerraf takes the 
view that we do not perceive numbers as sets. 
Stewart Shapiro says that the philosophy of mathematics does not need to 
answer questions of the type “does Gajus Julius Cesar = 3?” or “is 1ϵ 3?” It 
ought rather to show why those questions do not require an answer. 
2. Primary concepts 
Going back to early Greek thought, we find the word λεγω “collect”, “select”, 
“accumulate”. This verb is the origin of the noun λόγος, which from Homer and 
Hesiod through Heraclitus and Plato took a permanent place in Greek 
philosophy. Both λεγω and λέγειν also mean “speaking”. It may be wondered 
what connects speaking with collecting, this being a question about the 
connection of a distributive with a collective function. To quote Krzysztof 
Narecki: “The decisive factor here was an innovation in the form of a figurative 
meaning of λέγειν: ‘proceed, (follow) a list, enumerate [cf. Latin legere enatum], 
relate, narrate’. Just as spatially (physically) one goes through (looks through) a 
certain number of objects in order to collect them in a single place and as a 
single whole, that same act may be performed discursively, that is, merely by 
the use of reason one may go through (track) a series of words to combine them 
into a single, logical (i.e. meaningful) statement. ‘Speaking’ (like ‘collecting’) 
thus becomes a synthetic action, arising from the etymological meaning of 
λέγειν” [4]. 
Georg Cantor, inspired by the ideas of Plato, initiated a new groundbreaking 
theory – the Set theory [5]. The name “set theory” (Mengenlehre) from very 
early on gained primacy over the original term “theory of multiplicities” 
(Mannigfaltigkeitslehre) and came to be used universally in all mathematical 
publications. Cantor defines an multiplicity (Mannigfaltigkeit) in parallel with the 
concept of a set (Menge) as any multiplicity (jedes Viele) which can be 
considered as a unity (Eines), a generality of defined elements which by dint of 
some law may be unified into a single whole. He distinguishes a definite 
multiplicity (Vielheit), which can be considered as a kind 
of whole, unity, as a “ready thing” (ein fertiges Ding), which he calls an 
uncontradictory multiplicity or set, from a definite multiplicity which does not 
fulfil that condition and which he calls an absolutely infinite or contradictory 
multiplicity. Until the end of his life, Cantor would struggle with the task of 
giving a philosophical justification of his theory based on mathematics. 
The need for a philosophical foundation for the new theory was noted by 
Edmund Husserl, especially since he was both a mathematician and philosopher. 
In his “Logical Researches” [6] he explains the ideas of pure set theory. That 
work would enable Husserl, many years later, to make a profound philosophical 
analysis of the foundations of mathematics in Formale und transzendentale 
Logik. During those years he observed attentively the development of the new 
ideas, which inspired German mathematicians in their studies of the new 
mathematical entities. He was able to carry on a dispute with the mathematician-
philosophers (criticism of Frege’s Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik in 
Philosophie der Arithmetik, and Frege’s reply in his review of that work), draw 
conclusions from it, and in some matters concede that his opponents were right. 
Significant and important analysis of the fundamental concepts was provided by 
Józef M. Bocheński [7]. Bocheński introduced two theories: the theory of 
similarity and the theory of identity. 
The theory of similarity classifies things according to their similarity. The 
relation of similarity is a symmetric and reflexive relation. It concerns the bond 
existing between things being classified. 
The theory of identity concerns the bond of certain properties that pertain in all 
objects being classified. It is a symmetric, reflexive and transitive relation. 
These theories imply that we have to deal with two types of entities with 
different ontological status. For things to exist and for properties to exist are 
entirely different matters. Quine’s criterion – to exist is to be the value of a 
variable – is not applicable in this case. Willard Van Orman Quine attached 
great importance to this problem, although he formulated it in different 
categories [8]. He bases his analysis on the traditional distinction between general 
terms and abstract singular terms (“square” and “squareness”). He alludes to 
Frege’s principle of substitution of equals by equals. Abstract terms may appear 
in identity-related contexts, being subject to the laws of identity. Quine notes 
that general along with singular terms are treated equally, as names of separate 
objects. Detailed analysis of intension and extension in the axioms of set theory 
brings to light what might henceforth be called the problem of the empty set. 
Many authors adopt various systems for the set of axioms of set theory, giving 
them the common name ZFC. Few, however, permit themselves to make a 
philosophical analysis of the content of each axiom. And such an analysis is 
necessary. Frege was not mistaken when he claimed: “A mathematician who is 
not a philosopher is only half a mathematician.” 
3. Axioms 
Let us consider the axiom of extensionality, which is listed first in all of the 
systems of axioms. 
If sets a and b have the same elements, then they are identical. 
In symbols: 
I. ∀𝑎∀𝑏(∀𝑥(𝑥 ∈ 𝑎 ⟺ 𝑥 ∈ 𝑏) ⇒ 𝑎 = 𝑏)                 
The axiom of extensionality comes from Ernst Zermelo, who formulated it as 
the Axiom der Bestimmtheit (“axiom of decisiveness”) in 1907: “Ist jedes 
Element einer Menge M gleichzeitig Element von N und umgekehrt, ist also 
gleichzeitig M ϵ N und N ϵ M, so ist immer M=N [9]. The first formulation of the 
axiom was made by Bolzano [Grössenlehre], but was not published until after 
his death, in 1975 [10], but this had no influence on Zermelo’s work. 
Independently of Bolzano, the axiom was formulated by Richard Dedekind in an 
essay of 1888 [11] and it was on that formulation that Zermelo’s was based. 
Now, in all works on set theory, the term “axiom of extensionality” or “axiom of 
extension” is used. 
The axiom of extensionality is not an existential axiom. It does not postulate the 
existence of a set. It is a criterion for the equality of two given sets whose 
elements can be compared. Commentaries on this axiom highlight the legitimacy 
of extension, and at the same time indicate the possibility of forming intensional 
concepts. The roots of this axiom go back to the 17th century, to the principle of 
identity of indiscernibles (principium identitatis indiscernibilium) of Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz, which can be presented in the form: 
II.  ∀𝑥∀𝑦[∀𝑃(𝑃𝑥 ⟺ 𝑃𝑦) ⇒ 𝑥 = 𝑦]                                        
For any x and y, if x and y have the same properties, then x is identical to y. 
 This law is schematically the same as the axiom of extensionality. It is not 
principium magnum, grande et nobilissimum as Leibniz described the 
principium rationis – a basic principle for all representation, where any being is 
regarded as existing if and only if it has been secured for representation as a 
calculable object (Martin Heidegger). The law of identity of indiscernibles is 
nonetheless controversial in its essence (Max Black): objects may be presented 
having the same properties but not being identical (numerically nonidentical). 
Leibniz also believed that there cannot exist two things that are perfectly 
essentially similar. He tried to derive that principle from the Principle of Reason 
(nihil est sine ratione) [12]. The Principle of Reason directs a person to calculate. 
Reason is understood as ratio, as a calculation. A compact philosophical 
analysis of the principle was given by Martin Heidegger [13]. It is possible that 
Zermelo called his first axiom the “axiom of decisiveness” because for Leibniz 
the principle of identity of indiscernibles was a principle of individualisation. 
Extension was meant to determine a set definitively as a set. Quine accurately 
stated that we need sets as extensional distillates of properties [14]. Verifying 
that the elements of sets are the same requires reference to their properties – that 
is, to intension. Such verification or measurement of properties is nonetheless a 
step in the direction of their distinguishability. The question arises of whether 
wohldefinierte Eigenschaften well-define a set. When the set is a quantum 
system, measurement of a property (distinguishability) changes the set. The 
Hong–Ou–Mandel experiment [15] involving the interference of two photons, as 
well as many other experiments in quantum physics, show that measurement of 
the properties of elements of a set has an effect on the entire set. 
There is no controversy about the converse rule (the indiscernibility of 
identicals): 
 
III.  ∀𝑥∀𝑦[𝑥 = 𝑦 ⇒ ∀𝑃(𝑃𝑥 ⟺ 𝑃𝑦)]                                   
For any x and y, if x is identical to y, then x and y have the same properties. 
Let us consider a set consisting of eight elements: six line segments of unit 
length 1, and two segments of length √2. This can be pictured in the 
following system: 
     
  Fig. 1 
or in another system: 
     
  Fig. 2 
 
The latter is called Quine’s square, because he considered such a system when 
analysing the problem of universals [8].  
In both examples there appear identical objects. By performing reduction, in the 
first system we obtain two objects from eight, while in the second, from 33 
objects, we obtain five (a right-angled isosceles triangle, a square, a rectangle 
and two forms of general quadrilateral). 
In his analysis, Quine went further, demonstrating the possibility of reducing the 
five shapes to one square within whose area they appear. 
The question arises as to whether the two sets in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 are equal. 
Starting from the axiom of extensionality we find that the sets are identical, 
because they have the same elements. If we analyse the sets taking an 
intensional approach, we obtain two different sets. The set in Fig. 1 is a 
distributive set, while that in Fig. 2 is a collective set. It might be added that the 
set in Fig. 1 is an actually distributive and potentially collective set, while that in 
Fig. 2 is actually collective and potentially distributive. The need to pay attention 
to and to distinguish distributive from collective properties was pointed out by 
Edmund Husserl in his Philosophie der Arithmetik, rejecting Frege’s charge that 
he had not taken into account that in the phrase  vier edel Rose, vier and edel are 
properties of different degree. Vier is not a distributive property stated of every 
rose, but a property stated of a collective whole. If we permit geometric 
thinking, we might transform the figure in Fig. 1 into that of Fig. 2, which in 
turn proves to be a set of different figures. To make it possible to compare the 
two sets according to the axiom of extensionality, the elements of those sets 
must be distinguishable. Such an assumption is important in set theory, since it 
enables proof of the existence of a “scale of alephs”. If the elements of the two 
sets were indistinguishable, then we would have to count the elements in each of 
them to check their extension. Counting assigns a feature to each element, and 
the set of those features (numerosity) makes it possible to compare the sets. The 
axiom of extensionality is a recipe for the “measurement” of sets. The measure 
is the counting of the elements of the set. 
In the axiom of extensionality, the relation “is an element of”, denoted “ϵ”, is 
reflexive and symmetric, while the equality relation “=” is reflexive, symmetric 
and transitive. If we take the relation “ϵ” to be transitive also, then we are 
dealing with a collective understanding of a set. The relation of equality has an 
intensional basis, while the “is an element of” relation has an extensional basis. 
This difference means that this axiom, being the criterion for the equality of two 
sets, is also a weighing scale for intensional and extensional concepts. 
The second of the axioms on Zermelo’s list – although omitted from many 
contemporary workings of set theory, ranging from textbooks [16] to would-be 
philosophical analyses [17] – is the empty set axiom. 
There exists a set which does not have any element 
Symbolically: 
          IV. ∃𝑎∀𝑏 ¬(𝑎 ∈ 𝑏) 
From the start this axiom aroused much controversy. Zermelo calls this set  
improper (uneigentliche Menge). Bertrand Russell posed the question of whether 
a non-empty set remains a set if we remove all of its elements [18]. In a letter to 
Abraham Fraenkel in 1921, Zermelo expressed doubts as to the justification for 
the empty set. He even suggested giving up that axiom, with the help of an 
appropriate restriction of the axiom schema of specification/separation. 
There are also works which, with certain modifications to set theory (the system 
introduced by von Neumann and analysed by Robinson, Bernays and Gödel – 
NBG, VNB), accept this axiom [19]. A compact analysis of the empty set in the 
historical context is given by Akihiro Kanamori [20]. In essence this is a detailed 
discussion of axiom II on Zermelo’s list, which was called the axiom of 
elementary sets (Axiom der Elementarmengen). For this reason Kanamori 
considers the empty set, singleton and ordered pair within a single topic. In his 
remarks on the second axiom [21] Zermelo states, referring to the first axiom, 
that there exists only one empty set, while the singleton and ordered pair are 
unique. In a further remark [22] he states that the empty set is a subset of any 
set. 
The empty set axiom is the most important axiom, alongside the axiom of 
infinity, among the axioms of set theory. These two are existential axioms – they 
refer to the existence of mathematical entities. All of the others are 
“constructive” axioms, which we shall call C axioms (the subset axioms, pair 
axiom, axiom of union, power set axiom, and axioms of replacement, regularity 
and choice). The C axioms allow one to deduce the existence of constructed sets 
from the assumption of the existence of certain other sets. 
From Zermelo onwards it has become accepted to deduce from the axiom of 
extensionality that there is only one empty set (in many identical copies, as  
a subset of every set). This reasoning is false, as it is based on a categorical error. 
The empty set axiom, together with the axiom of infinity, is superordinate to the 
other axioms. The empty set has an empty actual extension, but it also has an 
infinite potential intension. 
From the axiom of extensionality one can deduce the uniqueness of the sets 
derived from the C axioms, except for the axiom of choice. One can prove the 
uniqueness of a power set; but in attempting to prove the uniqueness of the 
empty set, that scheme is inappropriate. 
3. Empty sets 
 The problem of the empty set in mathematics, and failure to recognise its 
significance, has its roots in the beginnings of European philosophical-
mathematical thought, and reached a zenith in Leibniz’s Principle of Reason. 
Emptiness did not have any reason, any foundation, any attribute to exist in the 
ideal world of mathematical entities. The first philosopher to consider this 
problem was Edmund Husserl [1]. This work, completed in 1929 after more 
than a decade of silence, was written “(…) in one go and printed in just a few 
months – after I had thought for decades over the issues taken up” (from a letter 
to Roman Ingarden). It was a period when the development of set theory was 
taken up by mathematicians who were not interested in seeking philosophical 
foundations for it. Only Husserl’s student Roman Ingarden, also a philosopher 
and mathematician, appreciated the great potential of the aforementioned work. In 
Formale und transzendentale Logik Husserl defines the concepts of “set” and 
“cardinal number” at a level of pure and broadest generality, referring to 
“objectiveness in general”, “something in general” – in the most empty 
generality. This formality requires any material definition to be something 
indefinitely arbitrary. The basic concepts of set theory and the theory of cardinal 
numbers are syntactic creations, syntactic forms of the empty Something. 
Husserl sees in the derivative forms of something in general the unity of formal 
mathematics, which in all of its related disciplines has one basis – the empty 
region as something in general. 
Let us consider one more axiom, the axiom of union (Axiom der 
Vereinigung), the fifth on Zermelo’s list. 
Symbolically: 
  V. ∀𝐴∃𝐵∀𝑐(𝑐 ∈ 𝐵 ⟺ ∃𝐷(𝑐 ∈ 𝐷 ∧ 𝐷 ∈ 𝐴)).  
For any set A there exists a set U A which contains exactly the elements of the 
elements of that set, and is called the union of A. From the first axiom we know 
that there can be only one such set. In this case that deduction does not produce 
doubts as in the case of the empty set; nonetheless, the validity of the axiom of 
extensionality, as we have previously analysed, does give rise to such doubts. 
These considerations are important in view of the application of unions of sets in 
quantum physics. 
Let us introduce into our further deliberations a new axiom: 
The axiom of existence of sets: 
There exist infinitely many essentially different empty sets. Symbolically: 
         
        VI.  ∀∅𝑎∀∅𝑏(∅𝑎 ≠ ∅𝑏) 
An important property of empty sets is their uniqueness. If two sets are equal, 
then their empty sets are different. Symbolically: 
       VII. ∀𝑎∀𝑏(𝑎 = 𝑏 ⇒ ∅𝑎 ≠ ∅𝑏)    
In contrast to equal sets, sets that are identical to each other have identical empty 
sets. 
Symbolically: 
       VIII.  ∀𝑎(𝑎 = 𝑎 ⇒ ∅𝑎 = ∅𝑎) 
What is at issue here is the Principle of Identity. The essence of every set is its 
empty set. Important deliberations on the Principle of Identity were undertaken 
by Martin Heidegger [23]. Heidegger sees this Principle as a form of a 
fundamental principle which takes identity as a characteristic in being, that is, in 
the ground of a being (als einen Zug im Sein, d. h. im Grund des Seienden 
voraussetzt). Taking a leap away from this Principle, abandoning being as the 
ground of a being, one moves to groundlessness (Abgrund). However, this 
groundlessness is neither an empty nothingness or murky chaos, but an 
occurrence, denoted as Er-eignis (Doch dieser Abgrund ist weder das leere 
Nichts noch eine finstere Wirrnis, sondern: das Er-eignis). The empty set is the 
groundlessness for a set, it is not an empty nothingness but an occurrence for the 
set: it shapes and creates the set. 
An important property of empty sets is their probabilistic nature, which is 
revealed in interactions with other empty sets. Every set contains within itself an 
empty set with a probability dependent on the probabilities of the empty sets 
belonging to that set. 
Symbolically: 
       IX. ∀𝑎(∃∅𝑎 ⇒ 𝑃∅𝑎 =∪ ∅𝐴) 
This probability is the sum of the probabilities of the empty sets of the elements 
of that set. We now apply axiom V to empty sets: 
X.∀𝐴∃𝐵∀∅𝑐(∅𝑐 ∈ 𝐵 ⟺ ∃𝐷(∅𝑐 ∈ 𝐷 ∧ 𝐷 ∈ 𝐴)) 
In this case set B does not form the union of the empty sets of set A. Let us 
consider a simple example: 
A={{a,b},{b,c},{a,c}} 
U A={a,b,c}  
but: ∪ ∅𝐴 = 𝑃∅ab + 𝑃∅bc + 𝑃∅ac 
Another property of empty sets is the differentiation of the cardinality of sets 
by empty sets. 
Symbolically: 
     ∀𝐴∀𝐵(|𝐴| ≠ |𝐵| ⟺ 𝑃∅𝐴 ≠ 𝑃∅𝐵)   
If any two sets have different cardinalities, then the probabilities of their empty 
sets are different – and conversely, if the probabilities of any two empty sets are 
different, then the cardinalities of the sets are different. 
4. Quantum reality 
Quantum theory, which has enjoyed much success in physics, has raised 
questions to which it is difficult to give precise answers. One of these is the 
interpretation of Bell’s Theorem (Bell’s inequality). John Bell stated his theorem 
in 1964 [24]. It was presented in a simple way, in the language of set theory, 
using Venn diagrams, by Leonard Susskind (Fig. 3). 
 
Fig. 3 
According to the logic of set theory, we can write the following inequality: 
A not B + B not C ≥ A not C 
or 
(1+4)  +  (3+2) ≥ (1+2) 
(1+2)  +  (4+3) ≥ (1+2) 
which holds. 
Bell’s inequality is written in the form of an inequality of probabilities: 
 
     P(A not B) + P(B not C) ≥ P(A not C) 
However, experiments in quantum physics contradict this inequality. All 
interpretations to date are directed against the thought experiment of Einstein, 
Podolsky and Rosen (EPR). 
Attention has not been paid, however, to the imperfection of the mathematical 
apparatus used to describe quantum reality. Using the new axiom of empty sets 
we obtain a different Venn diagram, which can be used to present Bell’s 
inequality in a different form. 
                            Fig. 4 
 
 
Each of the three sets A, B and C has its respective empty set: ∅𝑨, ∅𝑩 and ∅𝑪. 
The following inequality holds: 
𝑃∅𝐴?̅? + 𝑃∅𝐵𝐶̅ ≠ 𝑃∅𝐴𝐶̅ 
Bell’s inequality takes the form: 
     P(A not B) + P(B not C) ≠ P(A not C) 
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